Frege, Sentence-questions, Questions, and Thoughts: a dialogue by Davies, Nathan William





In the last  forty years Dummett,  Hanks,  Künne, and Bobzien have claimed that when Frege
wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question [Satzfrage]1 was
not a thought [Gedanke] ((Dummett 1981: 307–308); (Hanks 2007: 142–143); (Künne 2010: 427–
429); (Bobzien 2021: 163–164)). Recently, Textor has claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn
und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was not a question [Frage] (Textor
2021: 227 fn.2). I think it is possible that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought
that the sense of a sentence-question was a question  and  a thought. To show that this possibility
should not be overlooked, I have written a dialogue in which Frege responds to Dummett, Hanks,
Künne, Bobzien, and Textor.2
Bobzien seems to think that when Frege wrote ‘Die Verneinung’, he thought that the sense of a
sentence-question was not a question (Bobzien 2021: 163–165). I think it is possible that when
Frege wrote ‘Die Verneinung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was a question and
a  thought.  Hence,  I  have  also  written  the  dialogue to  show that  this possibility  should  not  be
overlooked either.  
1 “Is 3 greater than 5?”, “Is the sun bigger than the moon?”,  „Ist Sauerstoffgas kondenierbar?“, and “Did Socrates
believe in the gods?” are sentence-questions. „Wo liegt Jena?“, “When did Kepler discover the elliptical orbits of
the planets?”,  and “Which natural  number is  the only even prime number?”  are not sentence-questions:  Frege
would have called them word-questions [Wortfragen]. 
2 The possibility that  at some point Frege thought that some questions were thoughts has,  I  think, already been
entertained. Künne seems to have thought that by the time Frege wrote ‘Der Gedanke’, Frege thought not only that
sentence-questions and assertion-sentences expressed the same thoughts, but also that sentence-questions expressed
questions and that some questions were thoughts (Künne 2003: 157–158, 167–168).  Nevertheless,  Künne later
wrote that in 1892 Frege was not yet of the opinion that sentence-questions expressed thoughts and that in 1892
Frege thought that sentence-questions expressed questions but not thoughts (Künne 2010: 428).
1
Nathan William Davies [2022.01.06]
“I thought that some questions were thoughts”
Dummett, Hanks, Künne, Bobzien:
You thought that the sense of a sentence-question was a thought when you wrote ‘Der Gedanke’.
But before, when you wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, you thought that the sense of a sentence-
question was not a thought…3
Frege: 
I  didn’t!  When I  wrote ‘Über  Sinn und Bedeutung’,  I  thought  that the sense of a  sentence-
question was a thought. 
Dummett, Hanks, Künne, Bobzien:
But you wrote this:4
The subordinate-sentence [Nebensatz] with  “that” [„daß“] after  “command” [„befehlen“],
“ask” [„bitten“],  “forbid” [„verbieten“]  would  appear  in  direct  [gerader]  speech  as  an
imperative [Imperativ]. Such a thing [ein solcher] has no Bedeutung, just a sense [Sinn]. A
command [Befehl], a request [Bitte] are indeed not thoughts [Gedanken], but nevertheless
they  stand,  with  thoughts,  on  the  same  level  [Stufe].  Hence  in  the  [den]  dependent
[abhängigen]  subordinate-sentences  [Nebensätzen]  of  “command” [„befehlen“],  “ask”
[„bitten“] etc., the words have their indirect [ungerade] Bedeutung. The Bedeutung of such a
sentence is therefore not a truth-value [Wahrheitswert], but a command, a request and the
like. 
It is similar with the dependent [abhängigen] question [Frage] in phrases [Wendungen]
such as “doubt whether” [„zweifeln, ob“], “not know what” [„nicht wissen, was“]. That here
too the words are to be taken in [in] their indirect [ungeraden] Bedeutung is easy to see. The
dependent  [abhängigen]  question-sentences  [Fragesätze]  with  “who”  [„wer“],  “what”
[„was“], “where” [„wo“], “when” [„wann“], “how” [„wie“], “whereby” [„wodurch“] etc.
seem at times to be very close to adverb-sentences [Adverbsätzen], in which the words have
their  normal  [gewöhnlich]  Bedeutung.  These  cases  [Fälle]  distinguish  themselves
linguistically through the mood [Modus] of the verb. In the subjunctive [Konjunktiv] we
have a dependent [abhängige] question [Frage] and indirect [ungerade] Bedeutung of the
words, so that a proper name [Eigenname] cannot generally be replaced by another of the
same object. 
In the cases so far considered, the words in the subordinate-sentence [Nebensatze] had
their indirect [ungerade] Bedeutung, and this makes it explicable [daraus wurde erklärlich]
that the Bedeutung of the subordinate-sentence itself was also an indirect [ungerade] one;
3 (Dummett 1981: 307–308); (Hanks 2007: 142–143); (Künne 2010: 427–429); (Bobzien 2021: 163–164). 
4 This is my translation of the relevant part of ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (Frege „Über Sinn und Bedeutung“ 2008:
35 [38–39]). Dummett cites the page numbers of the relevant part (Dummett 1981: 307). Parts of the relevant part
(and  translations  thereof)  are  cited  by  Hanks,  Künne,  and  Bobzien  ((Hanks  2007:  142);  (Künne  2010:  428);
(Bobzien 2021: 163–164)). 
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i.e. not a truth-value, but a thought [Gedanke], a command, a request, a question [Frage].
The subordinate  sentence could be understood as a name-word [Nennwort],  indeed,  one
could  say:  as  a  proper  name [Eigenname]  of  that  thought,  command,  etc.,  as  it  occurs
[eintrat] in the context of the complex sentence [Satzgefüges].
Frege:
If I understand correctly, you think that I thought:
that if the indirect Bedeutung of an  „ob“-sentence of  „zweifeln“ was a question then the
sense of a sentence-question was a question; 
that no question was a thought; and 
that the indirect Bedeutung of an „ob“-sentence of „zweifeln“ was a question.  
Hence you conclude that I thought that the sense of a sentence-question was a question and not a
thought.
Textor:
But they’re wrong. You thought that the sense of a word-question was a question, but you didn’t
think the sense of a sentence-question was a question.5
Frege: 
Actually, you’re all wrong. I did think the sense of a sentence-question was a question. But I also
thought the sense of a sentence-question was a  thought.  I  did  not think that no question was a
thought. I thought that some questions were thoughts. Let me explain. 
I wrote that no command was a thought and that no request was a thought. But I didn’t write that
no question was a thought because I thought that some questions were thoughts. 
I thought that  „ob“-sentences of  „zweifeln“ were similar to  „daß“-sentences of  „befehlen“ and
„bitten“ for at least three reasons. First, that the words of the „ob“-sentences and the words of the
„daß“-sentences had their indirect Bedeutungen. Second, that the  „ob“-sentences and the  „daß“-
sentences themselves had their indirect Bedeutungen. Third, that the indirect Bedeutungen of the
„ob“-sentences and the „daß“-sentences were not truth-values. 
But I also thought that  „ob“-sentences of  „zweifeln“ were different from  „daß“-sentences of
„befehlen“ and  „bitten“ because I  thought that the senses of the former but not the latter  were
thoughts. 
I thought that „ob“-sentences of „zweifeln“ were to sentence-questions what „daß“-sentences of
„sagen“6 were to  assertion-sentences.  So I  did think that  if  the indirect  Bedeutung of an  „ob“-
sentence of „zweifeln“ was a question then the sense of a sentence-question was a question. 
5 (Textor 2021: 227 fn.2).
6 Frege thought that the indirect Bedeutung of a „daß“-sentence of „sagen“ was a thought and Frege thought that the
sense of an assertion-sentence was a thought (Frege „Über Sinn und Bedeutung“ 2008: 29, 33 [32, 37]). 
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Maybe someone would have thought otherwise,7 but I thought that the indirect Bedeutung of an
„ob“-sentence of „zweiflen“ was a question. This is why I discussed „ob“-sentences of „zweifeln“
in the same paragraph in which I discussed other question-sentences whose indirect Bedeutungen I
thought to be questions.
I didn’t think that the senses of the other question-sentences were thoughts. I thought that those
question-sentences were to word-questions what  „ob“-sentences of  „zweifeln“ were to sentence-
questions. I had already made the distinction between word-questions and sentence-questions prior
to  writing ‘Über  Sinn und Bedeutung’8 and prior  to  making the distinction  between sense and
Bedeutung.9 Prior to making the distinction between sense and Bedeutung I thought that sentence-
questions  contained  “judgeable  content”,10 but  I  did  not  think  that  word-questions  contained
“judgeable content”. Similarly, when I wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, I thought that sentence-
questions contained thoughts, but I did not think that word-questions contained thoughts. I wrote
„eine Frage“ [“a question”] in writing „ein Gedanke, ein Befehl, eine Bitte, eine Frage“ [“a thought,
a  command,  a  request,  a  question”]  because I  thought  that  all of  the question-sentences  I  had
discussed had  questions as their indirect Bedeutungen but  not all of them had  thoughts as their
indirect Bedeutungen (that is my writing „eine Frage“ was not unnecessary).
Bobzien:
But  why did  you avoid  using  the  word  „Frage“ [“question”]  for  the  content  of  a  question-
sentence in ‘Der Gedanke’ and ‘Die Verneinung’?11
Frege: 
I didn’t avoid using the word „Frage“ for the content of a question-sentence in ‘Die Verneinung’!
Let me explain what I wrote. First I reiterated some things I had written in ‘Der Gedanke’, and I
wrote a footnote which I need to clarify:12 
A  sentence-question  contains  the  request  [Aufforderung]  to  either  acknowledge
[anzuerkennen]13 a thought as true or reject [verwerfen] it as false. For it to be possible to
fulfill this request correctly, it must be demanded: that from the wording of the question
[Frage],  the thought  which it  concerns  [es  sich handelt]  be  undoubtedly [unzweifelhaft]
recognisable [erkennbar]; and secondly, that this thought not belong to fiction [Dichtung]. In
the following, I always assume these conditions are met. The answer [Antwort] to a question
[Frage]1 is an assertion [Behauptung] which is based on a judgment, whether it is answered
7 In The german Language and its Literature [Die deutsche Sprache und ihre Literatur], Dr. Max Wilhelm Götzinger
(a German grammarian writing in the 19th Century) wrote that an „ob“-sentence of „zweifeln“ had the form of a
question-sentence, but had no ‘underlying’ question (Götzinger 1839: 270  §125. 2.).  He wrote  „Die Form des
abhängigen Fragesatzes erscheint bisweilen, ohne daß eine Frage zu Grunde läge.“, and cites the „ob“-sentences of
„zweifeln“ later in the paragraph. I became aware of this book by reading (Künne 2015).
8 (Frege „Logik 1879–1891“ 1983: 8).  
9 See the editors’ footnote (Frege „Logik 1879–1891“ 1983: 1–2) or the translation of the relevant part of it (Frege
“Logic 1879–1891” 1979: 1).
10 (Frege „Logik 1879–1891“ 1983: 8).
11 (Bobzien 2021: 165).
12 (Frege  „Die  Verneinung“ 1966:  54  [143–144]).  The  translations  of  ‘Die  Verneinung’ which  are  given  in  the
dialogue are my own. 
13 See (Künne 2013: 57, 59–63) for a discussion of „anerkennen“. 
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in the affirmative or the negative.
1 Here  and  in  the  following  I  always  mean a  sentence-question  [Satzfrage] when  I  just  write
“question” [„Frage“]
This  footnote  is  misleading.  What  I  meant  was that  whenever  I  was writing  of  a  question-
sentence or  of  a  type of  question-sentence  and just  wrote  „Frage“ [“question”] (as  opposed to
„Satzfrage“ [“sentence-question”] or „Fragesatz“ [“question-sentence”]) I meant sentence-question
[Satzfrage] (and not  word-question [Wortfrage]). It is not the case that I  always meant  sentence-
question when I wrote „Frage“ [“question”]: later, in writing of something which I thought could be
contained  by  a  sentence-question,  I  wrote  „Frage“ [“question”] but  I  didn’t  think  a  sentence-
question could ‘contain’ a sentence-question, even though this might have been implied by what I
wrote in this footnote. 
My meaning sentence-question whenever I wrote of a question-sentence or of a type of question-
sentence and just wrote „Frage“ is similar to my meaning sentence-question and not word-question
when I wrote  „Fragesatz“ [“question-sentence”] in this part of ‘Der Gedanke’:14 „Fragesatz und
Behauptungssatz enthalten deselben Gedanken“ [“A question-sentence and an assertion-sentence
contain the same thought”]. Also in ‘Logik 1879–1891’15 I wrote „der Frage“ [“the question”] and
wrote this footnote: „Es ist hier natürlich nur von der Satzfrage, nicht von der Wortfrage die Rede“
[“There is here, of course, only talk of the sentence-question, not of the word-question”].16 
Now, I think I was responding to my colleague Bruno Bauch in ‘Die Verneinung’,17 and I was
considering the view that the being of a thought consists in its being true. Hence I wrote:18
Here,  however,  a  difficulty  arises.  If  the  being  [Sein]  of  a  thought  is  its  being  true
[Wahrsein], then the expression [Ausdruck] “false thought” [„falscher Gedanke“] is just as
contradictory  [widerspruchsvoll]  as  the  expression  “non-being  thought”  [„nichtseiender
14 (Frege „Der Gedanke“ 1966: 35 [62]).
15 (Frege „Logik 1879–1891“ 1983: 8).
16 See also (Textor 2021: 227). Textor said that it seemed that in ‘Logik 1897’, Frege first excluded question-sentences
“in general” from expressing senses which were either true or false “only to give, ten pages later,” an example of an
assertion-sentence which expressed the same thought as a sentence-question (Textor 2021: 227). He thought that
“the ensuing confusion” would be “dispelled” if we were to “bear in mind” the footnote from ‘Logic 1879–1891’
(Textor 2021: 227). Textor thought that Frege should not have “unguardedly” written that question-sentences were
not  truth-evaluable,  and  should  have  instead  written  that  sentence-questions  were  truth-evaluable  but  word-
questions were not (Textor 2021: 227). 
This is my translation of the relevant part of ‘Logik 1897’, in which Frege discusses the predicate [Prädikat]
„wahr“ [“true”]:
Of course [wohl] one [man] mostly [Am meisten] ascribes [legt...bei] our predicate to sentences;
however the desire-sentences, question-sentences, request-sentences, and command-sentences are to
be excluded and only the assertion-sentences come into consideration, those sentences, in which we
communicate facts, put forward [aufstellen] mathematical laws or natural laws. 
(Frege „Logik 1897“ 1983: 140)
Textor seems to have thought that Frege thought, or that Frege should have thought, that a sentence’s having a true
or false sense was a sufficient condition for its being true or false.  If Frege did think this, or should have thought
this, I do not know why. I grant that Frege wrote „wenn wir einen Satz wahr nennen, meinen wir eigentlich seinen
Sinn“ [“when we call a sentence true we really mean its sense”] (Frege „Der Gedanke“ 1966: 33 [60]). (See also
(Frege „Logik 1897“ 1983: 140).) However, this does not even suggest that Frege thought that a sentence’s having a
true or false sense was a sufficient condition for its being true or false. See also (Künne 2003: 168).
17 (Schlotter 2006). 
18 (Frege „Die Verneinung“ 1966: 54 [143–144]).
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Gedanke“]; then the expression “the thought that three is greater than five” [„der Gedanke,
daß drei größer als fünf ist“] is empty, and therefore it should not be used in science at all,
except between quotation-marks; then one should not say “that three is greater than five is
false” [„daß drei größer als fünf sei, ist falsch“] because the grammatical subject is empty. 
I  thought  I  would  confront  this  view  of  thoughts  with  my  view,  stated  explicitly  in  ‘Der
Gedanke’,19 that  a  sentence-question  contains  the  same  thought  as  a  corresponding  assertion-
sentence. Hence I wrote:20
But can one not  at  least  ask whether  something is  true?  In a  question [Frage]  one  can
distinguish [unterscheiden] the request [Aufforderung] to judge [urteilen] from the special
content [besonderen Inhalte] of the question [Frage], which shall be judged [beurteilt]. In the
following I will call [nennen] this special content simply the content [Inhalt] of the question
or the sense [Sinn] of the corresponding [entsprechenden]  question-sentence [Fragesatz].
Now, does the question-sentence
“Is 3 greater than 5?” [„Ist 3 größer als 5?“]
have a sense, if  the being of a thought consists in its being true? If the being of a thought
consists  in  its  being  true,  then  [dann]21 a  thought  cannot  be  the  content  [Inhalt]  of  the
question [Frage], and one is inclined to say that the question-sentence [Fragesatz] has no
sense at all. But that22 probably comes from one immediately recognizing the falsehood.
I  thought that even if one  would have been  inclined to say that the sentence-question  „Ist 3
größer als 5?“ had no sense because one thought it was obvious that it should be answered in the
negative, one would not  have been inclined to say of a sentence-question for which it  was not
obvious whether  it  should be answered in  the the negative,  that  it  had no sense (regardless  of
whether it should be answered in the affirmative or the negative). I thought one would have to agree
that a sentence-question of that kind contained “a question” [„eine Frage“] and thus had a sense.
Hence I wrote:23
19 (Frege „Der Gedanke“ 1966: 35 [62]).
20 (Frege „Die Verneinung“ 1966: 54–55 [144]).
21 I could have written any of these two simpler sentences instead (“Then a thought cannot be the content of the
question, …”, “If so, then a thought cannot be the content of the question, …”) but I did not because I think there
might have  been a mistake in Geach’s translation and I want the reader not to misunderstand what Frege wrote.
Geach’s translation is: “If not, the question cannot have a thought as its content…” (Frege “Negation” 1997: 347
[144]).  But  I  think  it  is  the  protasis of  the  preceding  conditional  question-sentence  which  is  relevant  to  the
understanding  of  the  „dann“ of  the  sentence  to  be  translated,  not  the  apodosis.  Frege  was  explaining the
consequences of the being of a thought consisting in its being true: the content of „Ist 3 größer als 5?“ couldn’t have
been a thought if the being of a thought consisted in its being true; if the being of a thought  didn’t consist in  its
being true then the content of „Ist 3 größer als 5?“ might have been a thought—a thought which was false. If it were
the apodosis which were relevant to the understanding of the „dann“, and Geach’s translation of “if not, ...” were a
correct translation of the sentence to be translated, then Frege would have written that if the question-sentence „Ist
3 größer als 5?“ did not have a sense, then one would have been inclined to say that it had no sense at all. But it
would not have made sense for him to have written this. Frege was not pointing to a connection between it not
having a sense and one’s inclination to say so. Frege was pointing to a connection between it not having a thought
as its sense and one’s (alleged) inclination to say that it had no sense at all.
22 “…that inclination…”.
23 (Frege „Die Verneinung“ 1966: 55 [144]). 
6
Nathan William Davies [2022.01.06]













have a sense? If one were to have found out that the question [Frage] should be answered in
the  affirmative,  one  could  accept  the  question-sentence  [Fragesatz]  as  meaningful
[sinnvoll]24, because it would have a thought as its sense. But what if the question [Frage]
should be answered in the negative? Under our assumption that the being of a thought is its
being true [bei unserer Voraussetzung], it would not have a thought as its sense.25 But the
question-sentence [Fragesatz] would still  have to have some sense or other [irgendeinen
Sinn], if it were to contain [enthalten] a question [Frage] at all. And is something not in fact
asked in it? Can’t getting an answer to it be desired?
These last two questions were rhetorical. I thought it obvious that one could desire that one get
an answer to the question(-sentence), and that something was in fact asked in it. I thought that one
would therefore be forced to accept that the question-sentence contained a “question” [„Frage“].
Here I didn’t mean sentence-question when I wrote „Frage“; this is what I was referring to before
when I was clarifying my footnote. When I wrote „Frage“ here I meant what I meant in ‘Über Sinn
und Bedeutung’ when I wrote „Frage“ in writing „ein Gedanke, ein Befehl, eine Bitte, eine Frage“. I
wrote that the question-sentence would have to have some sense or other if it were to contain a
question. I wrote this because I thought the question it would contain, were it to contain a question,
would be the sense of the question-sentence. 
Bobzien:
I thought that you might have thought that the question which it would contain would not be its
sense but would instead be a combination of its sense with a request.26 
Frege: 
I didn’t think that. Of course, should such a combination have existed, the existence of it would
have entailed the existence of a sense of the question-sentence, hence the conditional I wrote (“the
question-sentence would still have to have some sense or other, if it were to contain a question at
all”) would have been true. But I thought it was true for a different, perhaps simpler, reason. I
thought it was true because I thought that if it were to contain a question, the question it would
contain would be its sense. 
At the time of writing ‘Der Gedanke’ and ‘Die Verneinung’27 I still thought that the content of a
sentence-question was a thought, having already thought this at the time of writing ‘Über Sinn und
Bedeutung’. Hopefully now it is clear that at the time of writing ‘Die Verneinung’ I still thought that
24 “...as having sense/as having a sense…”. 
25 “If the question should be answered in the negative, then, under our assumption that the being of a thought consists
in its being true, it would not have a thought as its sense.”. “In that case, on our supposition, we should have no
thought that was the sense of the question.” (Frege “Negation” 1997: 347 [144]). 
26 (Bobzien 2021: 165).
27 (Frege „Die Verneinung“ 1966: 55–56 [145]).
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the content of a sentence-question was also a question, having already thought this at the time of
writing ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’.
In short,  when I  wrote  ‘Über  Sinn und Bedeutung’,  ‘Der Gedanke’,  and ‘Die Verneinung’ I
thought that some questions were thoughts, and I thought that the sense of a sentence-question was
a question and a thought.
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